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SEAN HAGAN*
I
INTRODUCTION
If one reviews the debt problems facing the membership of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) today—particularly in Central and Eastern Europe—it is
relatively clear that the most immediate challenges relate to the restructuring of
nonsovereign debt. For this reason, the focus of this brief contribution will be
on the difficulty of designing and implementing debt restructuring frameworks
in the nonsovereign and, in particular, the corporate context. Of course, these
issues possess a sovereign dimension in at least two respects. First, it is clear
that the debt crisis faced by many of our members is systemic in nature and
accordingly, will require some degree of intervention by the government—even
if the debt is held on the balance sheet of the corporate sector. Second, to the
extent that government intervention involves financial assistance, such
assistance may raise issues regarding the sustainability of the government’s own
indebtedness.
An understanding of the IMF’s perspective of these issues requires a brief
overview of the nature of our involvement. The IMF provides financial
assistance to its members in order to assist them in addressing their balance of
payments problems. Before it does so, however, it must make a determination
that two conditions have been met. First, since its resources are to be used to
help countries resolve their balance of payments problems, it is important that
the country be implementing policies that will address—rather than simply
delay the resolution of—its balance of payments problems. Second, the IMF
must ensure that “adequate safeguards” are in place to ensure that the member
will be in a position to repay the IMF within the relatively short timeframe
mandated under the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, generally three to five years.
“Conditionality” refers to the mechanism whereby IMF financial assistance
is made conditional upon the effective implementation of a credible adjustment
program, thereby ensuring, in turn, that the above conditions are in place. The
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adoption of appropriate adjustment policies is designed not only to give the
IMF some assurance that the underlying cause of the member’s balance of
payments problems will be corrected, but also to provide the IMF with an
adequate basis to conclude that the member will have sufficient financial
recourse to repay the IMF once the adjustment program has been successfully
implemented.
It should be emphasized that the amount of financing provided by the IMF
has traditionally been relatively modest in comparison with a member’s needs.
However, the IMF’s judgment that the member’s adjustment program merits
financial support is intended to “catalyze” financial assistance from other
sources and, in the medium term, facilitate return to capital markets.
II
THE IMF’S APPROACH TO CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE—COMPARISON
TO THE ASIAN CRISIS
In response to the recent financial crisis, the IMF has been providing
financial assistance in support of adjustment efforts to a number of countries in
Central and Eastern Europe. In looking at both the nature of their problems
and their adjustment programs, there are clear similarities with the countries we
assisted during the Asian crisis. In terms of the underlying balance of payments
problems, in Central and Eastern Europe, a number of countries had
experienced explosive growth that had been fueled by foreign borrowing. This
borrowing had been facilitated by a fixed exchange rate that made loans both
easier to secure and easier to service. Unfortunately, this growth created
enormous and unsustainable increases in asset prices, including in the housing
sector. This resulted, in turn, in a lack of confidence among foreign creditors in
the sustainability of policies—including exchange rate policies. As in the case of
Asia, this lack of confidence resulted in capital outflows and, because the
authorities did not have adequate resources to meet these outflows, the
exchange rate suffered a large depreciation. Importantly, since much of the
borrowing incurred by the banking, corporate, and household sector had been
denominated in foreign exchange, this borrowing resulted in the
overindebtedness of large portions of the banking and corporate sector.
As with the IMF-supported programs in Asia, a key element of the IMF’s
assistance in several of these countries has involved supporting a more realistic
exchange rate policy that would, among other things, boost competitiveness. As
a result of the dislocation in the balance sheets of the banks, corporations, and
households caused by the depreciation, the programs have also focused on a
comprehensive debt restructuring strategy.
Notwithstanding the similarities with the Asian crisis, however, there are
important differences.
First, the problems in Asia were triggered exclusively by a loss of confidence
in the policies of those countries. In Central and Eastern Europe, the outflows
have also been exacerbated by the deleveraging process that occurred at a
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global level due to the problems experienced in a number of developed
countries, such as the United States and the United Kingdom.
Second, during the Asian crisis, the stabilization program was achieved
through a combination of external financing from the IMF (and other official
creditors) and economic adjustment. Although there had been widespread
insolvency in the banking and corporate sectors, there was no need to rely on
exchange controls. In Central and Eastern Europe, however, this has not always
been the case. Most notably, in Iceland, the authorities have had little choice
but to rely on comprehensive exchange controls to staunch capital outflows and
thereby ensure the effectiveness of the stabilization programs. While these
controls were in place before the IMF approved the relevant stand-by
arrangement, the IMF recognized that, at least in the short term, these controls
were necessary given that the amount of external financing being provided,
even when coupled with the economic adjustment being implemented, was
outstripped by the level of capital outflows.
A key issue facing the countries in Central and Eastern Europe that have
been affected by the crisis relates to the design and implementation of a
corporate restructuring strategy. As in the case of the Asian crisis, the
overindebtedness of a large portion of the corporate sector has been triggered
not only by exchange rate depreciation but also by the collapse in availability of
credit arising from the insolvency of large portions of the banking sector.
Moreover, as in the Asian crisis, it is recognized that the restructuring of
corporate debt owed to nonresidents is necessary in order to regain access to
capital markets. More generally, of course, reducing the debt burden of the
corporations is a necessary condition for achieving greater employment and
economic growth.
III
LESSONS FROM THE ASIAN CRISIS
Accordingly, when contemplating the difficulties that are currently being
confronted in Central and Eastern Europe, it is natural to reflect upon lessons
that can be learned from the corporate restructuring that took place during the
Asian crisis. During the Asian crisis, government intervention supported the
restructuring process in three areas. First, the government established a legal
and institutional framework that would support the rehabilitation and
liquidation of enterprises, primarily through the adoption of insolvency laws
and the strengthening of the judicial system. Second, and relatedly, the
government established out-of-court frameworks that facilitated such
restructurings, albeit in the shadow of the formal insolvency system. Finally, to
the extent to which the sovereign became a creditor to the corporate sector by
virtue of its acquisition of liabilities through the bank restructuring process, it
also played a leading role in the negotiation strategy—often, through the
leverage gained by stronger legal enforcement powers that had been conferred
upon it in the enabling legislation. At the time, the prevailing view was that, as a
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matter of principle, public funds should not be used to support corporate
restructuring. There was a concern that such intervention would engender
moral hazard: by shielding both creditors and corporate debtors from their
losses, this intervention would only encourage risky behavior going forward.
Although public funds were used to support the restructuring of the banking
sector, the provision of these funds was considered an appropriate step given
both the systemic implications of the collapse of the banking sector and the
preexisting public exposure arising from the deposit guarantee system.
IV
WHY MORE GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION MAY BE NECESSARY
Looking at the challenges currently faced by the IMF’s members regarding
the overindebtedness of their corporate sectors, there are several reasons why a
more robust role for the government may be necessary going forward. At the
outset, one needs to acknowledge that recent events have demonstrated that
moral hazard concerns have been superseded by others. The level and depth of
government intervention in industrial countries, including financial
intervention, has been unprecedented. As evidenced by the U.S. intervention in
the automobile industry, this intervention has been extended to the corporate
sector. It is difficult to continue to apply the principle of moral hazard rigidly in
emerging markets when it is being applied rather more flexibly elsewhere.
Moreover, one of the lessons of the Asian crisis is that it is important to
manage expectations as to how quickly insolvency reform can be implemented.
As a legal matter, amendments to an insolvency law cannot be introduced in
isolation; they often require legislative modifications in other areas, including
contract enforcement and civil procedure. In addition, meaningful reform
involves more than just the adoption of legislation. Perhaps more than any
other legal framework, an effective insolvency system requires a competent
institutional infrastructure composed not only of the judiciary, but also of
professional trustees. As the experience of Asia demonstrates, an insolvency
law is as weak as the weakest institution that is charged with implementing it. In
addition, the implementation of an insolvency law during a crisis is complicated
by the pressure that vested interests often bring to bear. Since the introduction
of new laws or the amendments to these laws apply to existing debt, introducing
new rules to address an outstanding debt overhang makes the legislative process
a politically charged one. Finally, during a crisis, even the most effective
insolvency system may be overcome by the number of cases presented. While
an out-of-court framework can assist in this respect, many successful cases will
need to be processed through the formal system in order to take advantage of
the cram-down provisions of the law (that is, the use of pre-packaged or “fasttrack” bankruptcy).
Even if government is successful in putting in place a corporate debt
restructuring framework through the establishment of both a formal and out-ofcourt system, the question remains as to whether it will actually be used.
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Although an effective system should give creditors the legal leverage they need
to bring debtors to the table, experience demonstrates that many creditors will
prefer to bide their time until the economy recovers sufficiently to strengthen
the debt servicing capacity of the debtor. Of course, if all creditors take this
position, the overall restructuring process will be delayed, thereby undermining
the recovery. The problem may be viewed as a form of market failure and is
exacerbated by the fact that in many of these countries, there is very little
experience with corporate debt restructuring.
Given the above, it is relatively clear that the government may need to
provide additional incentives beyond an insolvency framework in order to
catalyze the restructuring process. Whether these incentives are financial or
regulatory in nature will depend on the situation of the country in question. For
example, in some cases, it may be possible for the government to provide
financing incentives in the form of guarantees on the restructured claims.
However, the viability of this approach will depend on the amount of fiscal
space available to the government. In some Central and Eastern European
countries, this problem is complicated by the fact that there is also pressure on
the sovereign to support the restructuring of consumer debt. For example, a
good portion of the mortgages in Hungary and the Ukraine were denominated
in foreign exchange and accordingly, the subsequent depreciation has had a
devastating impact on the balance sheets of that sector. Not surprisingly, there
has been considerable pressure on the government to provide some form of
financial support in this area. It should be noted that this problem was not
present during the Asian crisis.
When contemplating the design and implementation of a corporate
restructuring strategy in the context of a systemic crisis, it is necessary to
consider not only the instruments that will be the most effective, but also the
sequencing of the strategy. In particular, it is unreasonable to expect that there
will be a restructuring of corporate sector debt before macroeconomic
stabilization has been achieved. While values and prices are uncertain, creditors
and debtors are unlikely to be in a position to conclude agreements. Moreover,
one of the other lessons from the Asian crisis is that one needs a minimum level
of stability in the banking sector before a corporate restructuring strategy can
be implemented. Such stability may require significant recapitalization. Unless
banks are in a financial position to write down the value of their loans, they will
not be in a position to agree to the level of debt reduction that will be necessary
to ensure the viability of the corporation in question.
V
CONCLUSION
In light of the complexity of the issues identified above, it may be tempting
to seek simpler and faster solutions. Unfortunately, the IMF has not been able
to identify them. Across-the-board restructurings achieved through government
fiats that do not involve enterprise-by-enterprise analysis and negotiations
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among creditors and debtors can do lasting damage to the investment climate of
the country concerned. While a lesson from the Asian crisis is that the
government needs to be proactively involved in establishing incentives for the
rapid and orderly restructuring process, it should not substitute itself for the
parties concerned.

